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L
lsa.umich.edu
research
https://lsa.umich.edu/content/dam/econ-assets/Econdocs/RSQE%20PDFs/RSQE_US_Fo…
PCE inflation, the Fed's preferred measure, climbs to the 2.8–3.0 percent range year over year in 2025Q3– 26Q3, as tariffs filter through the economy. Since the beginning of April, uncertainty surrounding tariff policy pushed markets to price in four or more cuts in 2025, but market expectations have recently returned to their late-March levels. With buyer hesitation in a slightly looser housing market, home price growth is expected to remain modest in 2025H2, averaging a 3.0 percent annualized pace, before reverting to its 4.0 percent long-run pace by 2027Q1. • PCE inflation, the Fed's preferred measure, rebounds to the 2.8–3.0 percent range year over year in 2025Q3-26Q3 from about 2.5 percent recently, as tariffs filter through the economy. • Strong growth in goods imports fueled by tariff front-loading pushed the current account deficit-to-GDP ratio up to 4.6 percent in 2025Q1, exceeding the recent pandemic-driven peak in 2022Q1.
C
cbo.gov
official
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62105
Deficits are large by historical standards. The deficit totals $1.9 trillion in fiscal year 2026 and grows to $3.1 trillion in 2036.
R
reddit.com
article
https://www.reddit.com/r/economy/comments/1so3el1/investingtrading_these_4_ye…
Market volatility-wise, I think this is one of the worst in decades, where the shorts and longs are stressing/confused.
C
conference-board.org
research
https://www.conference-board.org/research/us-forecast
The TCB forecast calls for higher inflation and lower growth. Higher inflation may divert limited consumer funds towards energy and other affected products and
E
economics.td.com
article
https://economics.td.com/state-economic-forecast
Total population growth in Maine and New Hampshire kept pace with the nation owing to strong domestic migration inflows, while Vermont saw domestic migration outflows.](https://economics.td.com/domains/economics.td.com/images/reports/sef/2026-mar/chart3.png). Over the past 40 years, New jersey's unemployment rate has only risen to this level during recessions.](https://economics.td.com/domains/economics.td.com/images/reports/sef/2026-mar/chart4.png). Job growth in the Upper and Lower South Atlantic is generally firmer than in New England and the Mid Atlantic, underscoring a relative strength in the Carolinas.](https://economics.td.com/domains/economics.td.com/images/reports/sef/2026-mar/chart8.png). Year over year job growth has eased also eased as a result, though at around 1.4% it remains one of the better showings in the region.](https://economics.td.com/domains/economics.td.com/images/reports/sef/2026-mar/chart9.png). Florida’s domestic inflows have cooled sharply since 2022, contributing to a broader deceleration in the state's population growth.](https://economics.td.com/domains/economics.td.com/images/reports/sef/2026-mar/chart10.png). Price growth momentum has improved alongside a slightly better outrun in the national trend.](https://economics.td.com/domains/economics.td.com/images/reports/sef/2026-mar/chart11.png). With the main pillar supporting population growth – net international migration – expected to ease further, Florida population growth is projected to slow further this year.](https://economics.td.com/domains/economics.td.com/images/reports/sef/2026-mar/chart13.png).
I
imf.org
article
https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo
* [About](https://www.imf.org/en/about). * [Fiscal Policies](https://www.imf.org/en/topics/fiscal-policies). * [World Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo). * [Global Financial Stability Report](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr). * [World Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo). * [Global Financial Stability Report](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr). * [Regional Economic Reports](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/reo). ###### [World Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo). [Global Economy in the Shadow of War](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/04/14/world-economic-outlook-april-2026). [April 14, 2026](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/04/14/world-economic-outlook-april-2026). ###### [Global Financial Stability Report](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr). [Global Financial Markets Confront the War in the Middle East and Amplification Risks](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2026/04/14/global-financial-stability-report-april-2026). [April 14, 2026](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2026/04/14/global-financial-stability-report-april-2026). [Fiscal Policy under Pressure: High Debt, Rising Risks](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fm/issues/2026/04/15/fiscal-monitor-april-2026). ###### [Regional Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/reo). ###### [Global Economy in the Shadow of War](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/04/14/world-economic-outlook-april-2026). ###### [Global Economy: Steady amid Divergent Forces](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/01/19/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2026). ###### [Global Economy in Flux, Prospects Remain Dim](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2025/10/14/world-economic-outlook-october-2025). ###### [Global Economy: Tenuous Resilience amid Persistent Uncertainty](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2025/07/29/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2025). ###### [A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025). ###### [Global Growth: Divergent and Uncertain](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2025/01/17/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2025). ###### [World Economic Outlook, October 2024: Policy Pivot, Rising Threats](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2024/10/22/world-economic-outlook-october-2024). ###### [The Global Economy in a Sticky Spot](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2024/07/16/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2024). ###### [Steady but Slow: Resilience amid Divergence](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2024/04/16/world-economic-outlook-april-2024). ###### [World Economic Outlook Update, January 2024: Moderating Inflation and Steady Growth Open Path to Soft Landing](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2024/01/30/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2024).
C
corporate.vanguard.com
article
https://corporate.vanguard.com/content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/vemo/vemo-uni…
”The U.S. labor market remains fundamentally resilient, albeit transitioning toward a slower growth phase.”. While these headwinds are likely to weigh modestly on consumption, they are not expected to fundamentally alter the expansionary backdrop created by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, particularly as robust AI‑related capital expenditures continue to provide an important offset and remain a central pillar of growth momentum in 2026. We continue to view the labor market as fundamentally resilient, albeit transitioning toward a slower growth phase, and we have thus revised our year‑end 2026 unemployment rate forecast to 4.6% from 4.2%. We have revised our year‑end 2026 core inflation forecast up by 0.2 percentage points, driven by renewed firmness in non‑housing services, incremental tariff pass‑through, and higher energy prices amid escalating geopolitical tensions involving Iran. While we retain our expectation for a single policy rate cut in 2026—consistent with the Federal Reserve’s willingness to look through energy‑driven price shocks—the principal risk has shifted toward a longer period of policy inertia, particularly if labor market cooling remains gradual and inflation progress proves uneven.
S
siepr.stanford.edu
research
https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch
Most members clearly weighted the risks to the labor market more heavily than those of inflation, including Fed Chair Jerome Powell, though he did so while chanting the mantra that “there is no risk-free path for policy.” [[1](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#1)]. Taken together, this research finds little indication that AI has impacted aggregate U.S. labor market conditions so far.[[8](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#8)] Although unemployment has increased, it has risen most among workers in occupations with the least AI exposure, suggesting that other factors are at play. As two of us (Bernstein and Cummings) have written,[[11](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#11)] there are certainly bubbly features: Valuations of AI-exposed firms have risen sharply even as revenue from AI-specific products and services remains limited. For example, Joseph Briggs of Goldman Sachs estimates[[12](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#12)] that generative AI could create $8 trillion of value for U.S. firms through labor productivity gains. Analysis suggests that higher wholesale power costs, investment to replace aging grid infrastructure, extreme weather events, state policies such as net-metered solar and renewable energy standards, and rising demand from data centers and electric vehicles have all contributed to higher prices.[[14](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#14)].