8 results ·
● Live web index
news
R
rsmus.com
article
https://rsmus.com/insights/economics/economic-outlook-for-2026.html
In the United States, a modest economic tailwind fueled by expansionary fiscal policies and rate cuts will help push growth to 2.2% in 2026, write RSM US Chief Economist Joe Brusuelas and Economist Tuan Nguyen. * **Australia:** The economy will remain resilient amid global uncertainties, producing steady but modest growth of 2%, writes RSM Australia economist Devika Shivadekar. For this reason, we are attaching a 25% probability that growth will increase to 2.5% or higher as inflation eases and the Fed pushes its policy rate to 3% more quickly than investors are pricing in. Should productivity improve, those gains would create the conditions for a quicker return to the Fed’s 2% inflation target, which would provide the ingredients for stronger growth, lower Fed rates and a decline in the 10-year Treasury yield. The combination of a loosening labor market, slower pay growth and lower inflation will allow the Bank of England to cut interest rates in December and potentially twice more next year, taking rates to 3.25%.
S
spglobal.com
article
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/economic-outlook-us-q2…
* [*BRC Ratings – S&P Global](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/economic-outlook-us-q2-2026-curb-your-enthusiasm-s101676533). [Current Oil Price Surge To Weigh On Growth](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/economic-outlook-us-q2-2026-curb-your-enthusiasm-s101676533). [Baseline Forecast: Temporary Energy Shock, Forecast Conviction Low](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/economic-outlook-us-q2-2026-curb-your-enthusiasm-s101676533). [Inflation: Higher Energy Cost On Top Of Already Elevated Core](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/economic-outlook-us-q2-2026-curb-your-enthusiasm-s101676533). Before the war broke out, we were expecting to increase our growth forecast for this year closer to 2.5% on higher-than-expected growth in the second half of last year, looser financial conditions, lower uncertainty, larger assumptions for household tax refunds and big-tech AI spending, and steady growth in the first two months, as indicated by high frequency weekly economic indicators (see “[U.S. Real-Time Data: Energy-Related Inflation Risks Rise Against Steady Growth Momentum](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/101672676)," March 20, 2026). * [U.S. Real-Time Data: Energy-Related Inflation Risks Rise Against Steady Growth Momentum](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/101672676), March 20, 2026. * [S&P Global Ratings Raises 2026 Oil Price Assumptions On Longer-Than-Expected Oil Flows Disruption](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/101675235), March 16, 2026. * [Economic Research: New U.S. Inflation Risks Emerge While Price Pressures Build For Producers](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/101672683), March 3, 2026.
C
corporate.vanguard.com
article
https://corporate.vanguard.com/content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/vemo/vemo-uni…
”The U.S. labor market remains fundamentally resilient, albeit transitioning toward a slower growth phase.”. While these headwinds are likely to weigh modestly on consumption, they are not expected to fundamentally alter the expansionary backdrop created by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, particularly as robust AI‑related capital expenditures continue to provide an important offset and remain a central pillar of growth momentum in 2026. We continue to view the labor market as fundamentally resilient, albeit transitioning toward a slower growth phase, and we have thus revised our year‑end 2026 unemployment rate forecast to 4.6% from 4.2%. We have revised our year‑end 2026 core inflation forecast up by 0.2 percentage points, driven by renewed firmness in non‑housing services, incremental tariff pass‑through, and higher energy prices amid escalating geopolitical tensions involving Iran. While we retain our expectation for a single policy rate cut in 2026—consistent with the Federal Reserve’s willingness to look through energy‑driven price shocks—the principal risk has shifted toward a longer period of policy inertia, particularly if labor market cooling remains gradual and inflation progress proves uneven.
D
desapublications.un.org
article
https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-pro…
[Menu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026). * [About Us](https://www.un.org/en/desa/about-us)[Open submenu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-2). * [What We Do](https://www.un.org/en/desa/what-we-do)[Open submenu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-3). * [Key Topics](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/climate-action)[Open submenu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-4). * [Products](https://www.un.org/en/desa/products/publications)[Open submenu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-5). * [Highlights Report](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2023-2024)[Open submenu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-6). [Close submenu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-1)[Key Topics](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-1). * [Climate Action](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/climate-action). * [Data](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/data-sdgs). * [Financing](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/financing-sustainable-development). * [Publications](https://desapublications.un.org/). * [2023-2024](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2023-2024#0). * [2022-2023](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2022-2023). * [2021-2022](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2021-2022). * [2020-2021](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2020-2021). * [2019-2020](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2019-2020). [Skip to main content](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#main-content). * [Climate Action](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/climate-action). * [Data](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/data-sdgs). * [Financing](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/financing-sustainable-development). * [Products »](https://www.un.org/en/desa/products/publications). * [Publications](https://desapublications.un.org/). * [2023-2024](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2023-2024#0). * [2022-2023](https://www.un.org/en/desa/highlights-report-2022-2023). [Menu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#off-canvas "Menu"). * [All](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026). * [2026(6)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2026). * [2025(20)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2025). * [2024(26)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2024). * [2023(16)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2023). * [2022(22)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2022). * [2021(23)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2021). * [2020(12)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2020). * [2019(13)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2019). * [2018(10)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2018). * [2017(14)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2017). * [2016(13)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2016). * [2015(10)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2015). * [2014(13)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2014). * [2013(16)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2013). * [2012(14)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2012). * [2011(13)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2011). * [2010(18)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2010). * [2009(10)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2009). * [2008(9)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2008). * [2007(1)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2007). * [2006(1)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2006). * [2005(7)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2005). * [2004(2)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2004). * [2003(4)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2003). * [2001(3)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/2001). * [1997(1)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/year/1997). * [All](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026). * [SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth(108)](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/sdgs/SDG%208%20Decent%20Work%20and%20Economic%20Growth). [](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026). [Learn More](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026). [SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/sdgs/SDG%208%20Decent%20Work%20and%20Economic%20Growth). * [What We Do](https://www.un.org/en/desa/what-we-do). * [Climate Action](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/climate-action). * [Data](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/data-sdgs). * [Financing](https://www.un.org/en/desa/key-topics/financing-sustainable-development). * [Publications](https://desapublications.un.org/). * [Economic Analysis and Policy Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/). [Close menu](https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-economic-situation-and-prospects-2026#mm-0).
I
imf.org
article
https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/01/19/world-economic-outl…
# World Economic Outlook Update. World Economic Outlook Update, January 2026: Global Economy: Steady amid Divergent Forces. #### Resilient growth as technology and adaptability offset trade policy headwinds. World Economic Outlook Update, January 2026: Global Economy: Steady amid Divergent Forces. Global growth is projected at 3.3 percent for 2026 and 3.2 percent for 2027, revised slightly up since the October 2025 World Economic Outlook. World Economic Outlook Update, January 2026: Projections Table. ###### World Economic Outlook Update, October 2025: Three Essential Questions. ###### Press Briefing: World Economic Outlook, October 2025. ###### World Economic Outlook, October 2025: Key Facts. ###### World Economic Outlook Update, October 2025: Three Essential Questions. ###### Press Briefing: World Economic Outlook, October 2025. ###### World Economic Outlook, October 2025: Key Facts. ###### World Economic Outlook Update, October 2025: Three Essential Questions. ###### Press Briefing: World Economic Outlook, October 2025. ###### World Economic Outlook, October 2025: Key Facts. Regional Economic Outlook Reports, All Regions.
A
am.jpmorgan.com
article
https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-management/adv/insights/market-insights/m…
In addition, as I noted in an article last month entitled *“Why Stocks are Outperforming the Economy”*, the collective impact of structural changes such as increasing inequality, the rise of defined contribution retirement plans and embedded capital gains are pushing money into the stock market while deterring investors from cashing out. Not only is this very likely to cut estimated job growth in the year that ended in March 2025, but it will likely reduce job growth thereafter, an issue which we address when projecting monthly job gains for 2026 and 2027. We assume that this will reduce the effective tariff rate on goods from 11.0% entering 2026 to 7.5% by the end of the year, lowering inflation and boosting economic growth but also contributing to a deteriorating fiscal situation. However, we expect that lower tariff rates and fading fiscal stimulus in late 2026 cause CPI inflation to fall to 2.2% year-over year by the fourth quarter and to hover close to that level into 2027, allowing the Fed to finally achieve its 2% consumption deflator objective.
M
morganstanley.com
article
https://www.morganstanley.com/Themes/outlooks
### [2026 Global Outlook: A Strong Year for Risk Assets](/insights/podcasts/thoughts-on-the-market/global-economic-outlook-2026-cross-asset-perspective-seth-carpenter-serena-tang). **Seth Carpenter:** Yesterday, Serena, we discussed our views on the global economy, and today I'm going to turn the tables on you and start asking you questions about our market outlook and how to invest across regions and across asset classes. And this steepening will be very much driven by what happens in the two-year point – I think as markets continue to, we think, underpriced, future Fed easing and growth slow down tail risks. [Explore Episode](/insights/podcasts/thoughts-on-the-market/global-economic-outlook-2026-cross-asset-perspective-seth-carpenter-serena-tang). ### [2026 Global Outlook: Slower Growth and Inflation](/insights/podcasts/thoughts-on-the-market/global-economic-outlook-part-1-serena-tang-seth-carpenter). **Seth Carpenter:** We really think next year is going to be the global economy slowing down a little bit more just like it did this year, settling into a slower growth rate. Layer on top of that, the Fed who's been clearly willing to start to ease interest rates sooner than we thought at the time of the mid-year outlook – all comes together for a little bit better outlook for growth for 2026 in the U.S. [Explore Episode](/insights/podcasts/thoughts-on-the-market/global-economic-outlook-part-1-serena-tang-seth-carpenter).
S
siepr.stanford.edu
research
https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch
Most members clearly weighted the risks to the labor market more heavily than those of inflation, including Fed Chair Jerome Powell, though he did so while chanting the mantra that “there is no risk-free path for policy.” [[1](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#1)]. Taken together, this research finds little indication that AI has impacted aggregate U.S. labor market conditions so far.[[8](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#8)] Although unemployment has increased, it has risen most among workers in occupations with the least AI exposure, suggesting that other factors are at play. As two of us (Bernstein and Cummings) have written,[[11](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#11)] there are certainly bubbly features: Valuations of AI-exposed firms have risen sharply even as revenue from AI-specific products and services remains limited. For example, Joseph Briggs of Goldman Sachs estimates[[12](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#12)] that generative AI could create $8 trillion of value for U.S. firms through labor productivity gains. Analysis suggests that higher wholesale power costs, investment to replace aging grid infrastructure, extreme weather events, state policies such as net-metered solar and renewable energy standards, and rising demand from data centers and electric vehicles have all contributed to higher prices.[[14](https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/us-economy-2026-what-watch#14)].