The Economic Forecast for the Next 5 Years suggests a steady but moderate growth trajectory for the US economy, averaging around 2% annually.
The 2025–2027 Outlook As tariff headwinds dampen consumer spending and restrain real activity, we expect headline GDP growth to slow to 1.7 percent in 2025Q3. With the labor market weakening and tariff-induced price pressure materializing, growth slips further to 0.6 percent in 2025Q4. 7 pronounced than many market observers had anticipated, the latest Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation rate of 3.3 percent year over year suggested that more tariff pass-through is probably still forthcoming. • As tariff headwinds dampen consumer spending and restrain real activity, we expect the headline GDP growth rate to slow to 1.7 percent in 2025Q3. With the labor market weakening and tariff-induced price pressure materializing, growth slips further to 0.6 percent in 2025Q4. • China's economic growth in the first half of 2025 has held up well in the face of higher U.S. tariffs; the quarterly annualized pace has averaged 4.7 percent.
In CBO's projections, real GDP grows at an average rate of 1.6 percent per year from 2025 to 2055, slightly slower than the growth of real
Beyond that, CBO projects growth to normalize at about 1.8 percent per year. CBO had previously projected PCE inflation of 2.2 percent this year and 2.1 percent next year. CBO’s projections follow closely those of the Federal Reserve, which expects inflation to total 3.0 percent in 2025, 2.6 percent in 2026, and 2.0 percent in the long run. CBO now projects a much higher spike in the unemployment rate this year to 4.5 percent, a drop in unemployment in 2026 to 4.2 percent, and then a stabilization at 4.4 percent in 2027 and 2028. (Because inflation is projected to fall over that period, this represents a rise in real interest rates.) CBO previously projected rates to fall more quickly to 3.9 percent. As inflation eases and the Federal Reserve continues its rate-cutting cycle, CBO projects rates on the three-month Treasury bill to decline from 5.0 percent in 2024 to 4.1 percent in 2025, 3.5 percent in 2026, and 3.2 percent by 2028.
Nominal GDP from 2026 to 2035 and inflation from 2026 to 2029 are now expected to be higher than previously projected. The forecast of short-
[Previous Issues](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO). [español](/es/publications/weo/issues/2025/10/14/world-economic-outlook-october-2025?path=publications%2Cweo%2Cissues%2C2025%2C10%2C14%2Cworld-economic-outlook-october-2025). [العربية](/ar/publications/weo/issues/2025/10/14/world-economic-outlook-october-2025?path=publications%2Cweo%2Cissues%2C2025%2C10%2C14%2Cworld-economic-outlook-october-2025). [中文](/zh/publications/weo/issues/2025/10/14/world-economic-outlook-october-2025?path=publications%2Cweo%2Cissues%2C2025%2C10%2C14%2Cworld-economic-outlook-october-2025). [русский](/ru/publications/weo/issues/2025/10/14/world-economic-outlook-october-2025?path=publications%2Cweo%2Cissues%2C2025%2C10%2C14%2Cworld-economic-outlook-october-2025). [français](/fr/publications/weo/issues/2025/10/14/world-economic-outlook-october-2025?path=publications%2Cweo%2Cissues%2C2025%2C10%2C14%2Cworld-economic-outlook-october-2025). [日本語](/ja/publications/weo/issues/2025/10/14/world-economic-outlook-october-2025?path=publications%2Cweo%2Cissues%2C2025%2C10%2C14%2Cworld-economic-outlook-october-2025). As a result, global growth projections in the latest World Economic Outlook (WEO) are revised upward relative to the April 2025 WEO but continue to mark a downward revision relative to the pre-policy-shift forecasts. * [Full Report](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/text.pdf). * [Executive Summary](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/execsum.pdf). * [Foreword](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/foreword.pdf). * [Blog](https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2025/10/14/global-economic-outlook-shows-modest-change-amid-policy-shifts-and-complex-forces). * [October 2025 Database](https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.RES:WEO). * [Read Chapter 1](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/ch1.pdf). * [Chapter 1 Data](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/data/ch1data.xlsx). * [commodity special feature](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/commodityspecialfeature.pdf). * [online annex](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/ch1onlineannex.pdf). * [Read the Blog](https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2025/10/14/global-economic-outlook-shows-modest-change-amid-policy-shifts-and-complex-forces). * [Database](https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.RES:WEO). * [Read Chapter 2](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/ch2.pdf). * [Chapter 2 Data](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/data/ch2data.xlsx). * [Read the Blog](https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2025/10/06/good-policies-and-good-luck-helped-emerging-economies-better-resist-shocks). * [Online Annexes](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/ch2onlineannexes.pdf). * [Read Chapter 3](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/ch3.pdf). * [Chapter 3 Data](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/data/ch3data.xlsx). * [Online Annexes](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/ch3onlineannexes.pdf). ###### [Statistical Appendix:](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/statsappendix.pdf). [Data assumptions, conventions, and classifications](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/statsappendix.pdf). ###### [Statistical Appendix A:](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/tablea.pdf). [Key Global Economic Indicators](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/tablea.pdf). ###### [Statistical Appendix B:](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/tableb.pdf). [Supplemental Global Economic Indicators](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/tableb.pdf). [October 2025 Database](https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.RES:WEO). [FAQ on the October 2025 Release](https://data.imf.org/en/Datasets/WEO/Frequently-Asked-Questions). * [World Economic Outlook](/en/publications/weo). * [Latest Issue](/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/04/14/world-economic-outlook-april-2026). * [Getting to Growth in an Age of Uncertainty](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/areb/issues/2025/09/24/annual-report-2025). * [Latest Issues](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO). * [The Debt Reckoning](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd).
| 2028 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 4.3 | 4.3 | N.A. The charts below provide some insight into the degree of uncertainty the forecasters have about their projections for the rate of growth in the annual-average level of real GDP. For each of the four years, the forecasters are raising their probability estimates from those in the previous survey that the annual-average unemployment rate will be in the range of 4.3 percent to 4.8 percent. They predict current-quarter headline CPI inflation will average 3.1 percent at an annual rate, up slightly from the previous prediction of 3.0 percent. Headline PCE inflation over the current quarter will be at an annual rate of 2.9 percent, down from the previous estimate of 3.0 percent. Over the next 10 years, 2025 to 2034, the forecasters predict headline CPI inflation will be an annual-average rate of 2.38 percent, higher than the estimate of 2.31 percent in the previous survey.
This reflects the sizable capital expenditure plans that AI “hyperscalers” have announced for this year.[4](https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/economy/us-economic-forecast/united-states-outlook-analysis.html#endnote-4)We now expect real business investment to grow by 4% in 2026—an acceleration from the second half of 2025. The federal deficit is expected to remain above 6% of GDP through 2030, exceeding the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) baseline expectation.[6](https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/economy/us-economic-forecast/united-states-outlook-analysis.html#endnote-6)The larger expected deficit is partially due to our lower forecast for net migration. Companies are attempting to reclaim tariffs they paid after the Supreme Court ruled that the tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act are impermissible.[11](https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/economy/us-economic-forecast/united-states-outlook-analysis.html#endnote-11) Because we expect companies to recoup those funds, they are also likely to be more restrained in the near term when passing tariff costs on to consumers. The University of Michigan’s survey of inflation expectations in five years was 3.2% in March, down from 4.1% one year earlier.[12](https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/economy/us-economic-forecast/united-states-outlook-analysis.html#endnote-12). Stock markets have shown considerable strength, with the S&P 500 stock price continuing to grow at double-digit year-over-year rates at the time of this writing.[13](https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/economy/us-economic-forecast/united-states-outlook-analysis.html#endnote-13)Optimism around the potential of AI has boosted earnings and raised expectations of future growth.